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Omid Payrow Shabani, Guelph, Canada 
 
The Emerging Non-Violent Character of the Iranian Protest Movement 
 
Abstract: In assessing the aftermath of the fraudulent presidential election of 2009 in Iran, one question 
has received less critical analysis than other complexities of this event: What can explain the remarkable 
non-violent character of the Green Movement in Iran? I propose that the answer, inter alia, lies with the 
following three learning experiences: 1) The experience of loss brought about by the Iran/Iraq war; 2) the 
experience of relative opening during Khatami’s presidency; and 3) the experience of modernization of 
faith  in  the  work  of  the  post-Islamist  thinkers  that  aimed  to  make  political  Islam  compatible  with 
democracy.  Together, these learning processes fostered a new mode of thinking that is civil and non-
violent in character. 
Key words: Democracy, Iranian Politics, Non-violence, Green Movement, Tolerance. 
 
Introduction 
The last presidential election  in Iran marked the birth of a protest movement—known as the 
Green movement—that was characterized by a peaceful and civic ethos. Since then a growing 
literature has reflected upon and analyzed various aspects of the movement.  A quick survey of 
this literature shows that much has been said about the Green Movement’s strength, composition, 
boundary and future (Ansari 2010; Dabashi 2011; Hashemi & Postel 2010), while an account of 
its non-violent character is yet to be developed. In this paper I intend to fill this gap by proposing 
that,  inter  alia,  three  learning  experiences  in  post-revolutionary  Iran  could  contribute  to  our 
understanding of the non-violent character of the Green Movement. In the first section, I show 
how the experience of loss brought about by the Iran/Iraq war made most people more disinclined 
to engage in any forms of violence as a means of achieving political goals. In the second section, 
I argue how this aversion to violence fostered and cultivated a civic attitude during the relative 
opening of the civil society during Khatami’s presidency. In the third section, I contend that the 
work  of  the  post-Islamist  thinkers—aimed  at  making  political  Islam  compatible  with 
democracy—provided  a  theoretical  underpinning  for  the  experiences  of  civic  and  peaceful 
engagement. Finally, in the last section of the paper I demonstrate how the claims of the first 
three sections of the paper converge in their elucidation of the non-violent character of the Green 
Movement.  
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I. The Iran/Iraq War: Its Human Cost and the Experience of Loss 
Shortly after the Iranian Revolution in September of 1980, Saddam Hussein, encouraged and 
supported by the United States and other western and regional powers, began a costly adventure 
with  a  full-scale  ground,  air  and  sea  assault  on  Iranian  territory.  He  had  calculated  that  the 
revolutionary chaos in Iran had given him a golden opportunity to replace Iran as the dominant 
power  in  the  region,  taking  full  control  of  the  Shatt  al-Arab  river  and  annexing  the  oil-rich 
province of Khuzestan. Initially, the Iraqi forces managed to make some gains in Iranian territory, 
but these gains were limited and by 1983 Iran began to regain the lost territories and took the 
offensive. The war lasted for eight years, until August of 1988, when the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 598 to cease hostilities was accepted by both sides.   
  The war was the longest conventional war of the twentieth  century. Surprised by the 
undeclared attack, Iran resorted to the full mobilization of its population (Basij).
1 The Iranians 
engaged in trench warfare, deploying multiple waves of soldiers, bayonet-charging across barbed 
wire and minefields, incurring in high casualties. To combat this tactic, Iraqi forces  resorted to 
widespread use of chemical weapons like mustard gas, against both military and civilian Iranian 
targets (Abrahamian, 2008:, 171-172; Wright 2008: 438; Rajaee 1993; Katouzian 2009: 344). 
The duration and the intensity of the war dramatically inc reased the number of casualties, 
particularly during the last three years of the conflict.  According to the Islamic government of 
Iran, the number of Iranians killed by the end of the war was 160,000. While high estimates put 
this number as high as 1,000, 000 (Hiro, 1989: 1-5), more sober estimates put the number at 
300,000-500,000. Moreover, circa 100,000 Iranians, both military and civilian, were victims of 
the Iraqi’s chemical weapons (Fassihi 2002; Sciolino 2003, Hughes 2003). The general mood of 
the country was disconsolate due in large part to the human cost of the war and the lack of civil 
liberties. To appreciate this atmosphere, consider that after the fall of every Iranian soldier, his 
picture  was  printed  in  different  sizes  and  plastered  all  over  his  hometown  (Ghamari-Tabrizi 
2009). A few years into the war, the walls of every city, large and small, throughout the country 
were covered with these posters, which served as a continual reeminder of the human cost of the 
war. The psychological burden of this feeling of loss was augmented by the necessities of taking 
care of more than 500,000 wounded soldiers during the war (Iran Chamber Society, p.3). Adding 
                                                           
1 Basij grew into a vast paramilitary army, which played an important role in the war. After the war, however, its role 
changed as it came more and more to be used for internal operations against civilians. In 2010 it was incorporated 
into  the  Revolutionary  Corps  and  deployed  against  the  Green  Movement,  showing  zeal  in  repressing  the 
demonstrations.    
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to this burden, there were more than 80,000 people affected by exposure to chemical gases who 
became long-term victims of the war.  Moreover, the economic loss on both sides was estimated 
at more than a trillion dollars (Encyclopedia Iranica; Hiro 1989; Askari 2009: 118; Amirahmadi 
1990; Mofid 1990).  The cost of the war entailed economic hardship and decline in the standard 
of living during the post-war period (Hakimian & Karshenas 2000, Keddei 2003: 264).
2 Agreeing 
to the settlement of the UN 598 Resolution, which returned the warring parties to the pre -war 
border as determined by the 1975 Algiers Accord, the radical and revolutionary aspirations gave 
way to skepticism and despair. By the end of war, there was a widespread drop in morale; most 
people seemed to have lost their revolutionary  appetite for more violence, hoping for the 
normalization of the economy, society and relations with Iran’s neighbors (Dabashi 2010: 45). 
During the war, the great loss of life and the need for greater sacrifice had been justified by 
appealing to nationalist sentiments and the Shiite cult of martyrdom. After the war, however, 
such appeals lost a great deal of their justificatory and motivational power. 
 
II. The Relative Opening of the Civil Society during Khatami’s Presidency 
The experience of war radically transformed some of the most influential revolutionary figures of 
the 1980s. After the war, the former hostage takers, the veterans of the Iran-Iraq war and the 
founding and early members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps got a chance to get away 
from  their  militarized  consciousness,  go  to  university,  and  become  journalists,  academics, 
politicians  and  writers.    Old  revolutionaries  like  Mahdi  Karroubi,  Behzad  Nabavi,  Saeed 
Hajjarian and Mohamad Mousavi Kho’ini-ha became liberal-minded reformists who championed 
the candidacy of a little known figure at that time, Mohammad Khatami, for presidency (Ansari 
2000: 94). At that point the only offices that Khatami had held were of director of the National 
Library and Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance for two years during Rafsanjani’s tenure as 
the President (Dhaeissari & Naser 2006:130; Ansari 2000: 111-140).  
While a few months prior to the May election in 1997, reformists had been written off as not 
having  any  real  chance  of  winning  the  election,  Khatami’s  campaign  energized  the  general 
population, particularly women and the youth, engendering in them a sense of hope (Katouzian 
2009: 365; Gheisari & Nasr 2006: 133-136; Sediqi 2005). This was largely due to Khatami’s 
emphasis on the importance of the rights of citizens, especially those of women and minorities, 
                                                           
2 Some of the hardship was due to the embargo on Iranian oil and the economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the US 
and other western powers after the revolution.  
 
4 
freedom of expression in general and cultural freedom in particular, the rule of law and the need 
to develop the civil society. He proposed a “dialogue of civilizations” instead of the “clash of 
civilizations.”
3 The 2
nd of Khordad 1376 in the Iranian calendar—May 23, 1997—was the day of 
the seventh presidential election, which gave the presidency, by a landslide (more than 70% of 
the 80% participants), to Khatami. The date marked what came to be known as the “Hemaseh-ye 
Dovvom-e Khordad” or the “Epic of 23 May,” the emergence of the Reform Movement in Iran.   
Immediately after his election, the policies on which Khatami had campaigned were pursued 
for implementation (Ansari 2000: 114-116). He appointed Ataollah Mohajerani, a reform-minded 
intellectual, as Islamic Culture and Guidance Minister.  Mohajerani relaxed the constraints on the 
press, encouraging many reformists to found new newspapers. Thus, in the first year of Khatami's 
presidency, 226 new publication houses received licenses. Khatami also appointed a woman, 
Ma’someh  Ebtekar,  as  his  vice-president  and  instructed  his  ministries  to  actively  promote 
women’s  causes.  There  was  a  sudden  surge  in  the  number  of  newspapers,  journals,  NGOs, 
political parties, social movements and associations in the areas of the environment, women’s 
rights, youth issues, and education. “The number of journals rose from 778 to 1,375” and the 
number of book titles  from 3,800 in  1986 to  23,300 in  2000 (Abrahamian 2008:191; Azimi 
2008:385). The number of NGOs grew by several thousand. Khatami himself established two 
NGOs
4 and financed a dozen more NGOs specializing in women’s issues (Keddei 2003: 280). 
Among the new NGOs, there were “3,000 youth NGOs, 600 environmental NGOs, 500 women’s 
NGOs, 60 NGOs engaged in human rights issues, and many other NGOs working for children 
and other vulnerable groups” (Namazi 2005). Towards the end of Khatami’s first term, there 
were 95 new political parties, 110 employers’ guilds and 120 workers’ guilds registered (Bayat 
2007:  109).  In  a  move  to  further  democratize  political  decision-making  processes,  Khatami 
enacted article 7 of the Constitution concerning the election of local councils by holding the first 
ever of such elections in February of 1999. The reform candidates won 90% of 200,000 seats in 
provincial, municipal and village councils. The move was seen as a step forward in the reformers’ 
strategy of social mobilization and democratization.  
                                                           
3  During  his  tenure  in  charge  of  the  Hamburg  Islamic  Institute  Kahtami  learned  German  and  studied  Western 
philosophy, particularly German philosophy and more specifically Habermasian theories of discourse ethics and 
communicative action, hence, Khatami’s stress on “dialogue,” “civil society,” “rationality,” and “discourse ethics” 
[akhlagh-e ertebati] as could be seen for example in his interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour in January 
1998, which can be found here http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html (retrieved on 18/06/2011) 
4 These are the International Institute for Dialogue among Cultures Civilizations and the Baran Foundation, which 
was a NGO. They can be found at  http://www.dialoguefoundation.org/ and http://www.baran.org.ir/ (retrieved on 
02/05/2011).   
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Gradually,  the  oppressed  civil  society  began  to  reemerge  with  new  institutions  and 
organizations engendering an open social and political space, where new ideas such as tolerance, 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law were publically discussed. Thus, Khatami’s main 
domestic achievements were a relatively open society, a freer press, the emergence of a large 
number of NGOs, cultural development, more social rights for women and the popularization of 
the idea of democracy (Katouzian 2009: 374; Keddei 2003: 280).
5  
The impact of these changes was both immediate and lasting. They fostered a new culture of 
dialogue, programs of rights and a generally more open society. While NGOs normalized the 
discourse of rights, the reform newspapers changed the whole tenor of public discussion. This 
change could be observed in the way public discourse improved. The public d iscourse up to 
Khatami’s  time  had  been  centered  around  such  terms  as  “imperialism,”  “mostazafeen” 
(downtrodden), “jahad” (crusade), “shahid” (martyr), “gharbzadegi” (westernization), “enghlab” 
(revolution) and so on. Now, however, the focus of public discourse began to change, with the 
institution  of  such  terms  as  “democracy,”  “pluralism,”  “modernity,”  “jam’eh  madani”  (civil 
society),  “hoqoq-e  bashar”  (human  rights),  “mosharekat-e  siyasi”  (political  participation), 
“goftego”  (dialogue),  “shahrvandi”  (citizenship)  and  the  like  (Abrahamian  2008:  186).  As  a 
result, the general attitude began to transform from an illiberal and radical revolutionary mode of 
thought to a humanist Islam that was more sensitive to rights and democracy. During Khatami’s 
second  term  (2001-2005),  the  sixth  Parliament,  which  was  dominated  by  reformist 
representatives, passed more than a hundred reform bills, including a ban on all forms of torture 
(Abrahamian 2008: 190).
6  
At around the same time, Iranian cinema thrived with Iranian film makers like Abbas 
Kiarostami, Mohsen Makhmalbaf, Bahman Ghobadi Jafar Panahi, and Rakhshan Bani-Etemad, to 
name just a few, wining critical acclaim at major film festivals around the world.  Similarly in 
music, the largest number of licenses was granted for traditional and pop albums to singers like 
Benyamin
7  and groups like the Arian band.
8  Thus, alongside the institutional changes that 
allowed an opening for the creative arts, the mood of th e cities began to change: warm colors, 
                                                           
5 Khatami also managed to improve Iran’s international standing by adopting a “détente policy” that helped Iran 
emerge from its self-imposed isolation. He was the first Iranian President to make official trips to various countries 
(Japan, France, Italy, Germany, Cuba Russia and China) and he also invited and received foreign leaders (Ansari 
2000: 139). 
6  Most of these bills, of course, were rejected by the hardline conservative Guardian Council, a body that is 
constitutionally empowered to ensure that laws enacted by the Parliament are in line with Islamic law.  
7 http://www.benyaminmusic.com/ (accessed on 03/06/20110) 
8 http://www.arianmusic.com/ (accessed on 03/06/20110)  
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particularly in young people’s clothing, gradually replaced the grey and black; the posters and 
murals of the martyrs came increasingly to be posted over by commercial posters. The youth 
were resisting and rejecting the ethics of continuous mourning and its depressing religious music 
in favor of a happier spirit and more allegro rhapsodies.
9       
The reformist newspapers, in their running battle with such hardline institutions as the 
judiciary, gave currency to such terms as “dialogue,” “tolerance” and “moderation,” condemning 
the  conservative  interpretations  of  Shi’ite  jurisprudence  and  ethics  that  “promoted  sorrow  or 
celebrated  violence”  (Shahidi  2007:  60-65).  A  vibrant  public  forum  emerged  where  the 
participants got a chance to experience their communicative power and civil rights and to learn 
about democracy. These changes marked a learning experience that began after the war and took 
root during Khatami’s time, growing into a new attitude and mode of thinking that aspired to 
open society, political pluralism and human rights. Iranian political theorist, Nader Hashmi,
10 
assesses the period in the following way:  
Iranian society during the two -term presidency of Muhammad Khatami (1997 -2005) was 
engaged in full-scale internal debate about the relationships between tradition and modernity, 
democracy and theocracy, civil law and religious law, human rights and religious duties. The key 
axis of controversy around which this debate unfolded was the normative relationship bet ween 
religion and government in Iranian society (Hashemi 2009: 91).   
This debate characterizes the project of renovation in which some religious intellectuals 
engaged and I will turn to it in the next section of this paper. To sum up this section, we can  say 
that perhaps the foremost achievement of this period was showing that presenting alternative 
ideas to the revolutionary and conservatives programs could be done in a non-violent manner. 
 
 
 
                                                           
9 Also at this time a parallel underground music scene was flourishing, showcasing the work of Iranian rap artists 
like Shahin Najafi (http://www.shahin-najafi.com/ accessed on 03/06/20110), and Amir Tataloo (http://www.amir-
tataloo.com/#/biography  accessed  on  03/06/20110)  and  rock  bands  like  Kiosk  (http://www.kiosktheband.com/ 
accessed on 03/06/20110) and O-Hum (http://www.o-hum.com/about.htm accessed on 03/06/20110). 
10 In his book, Islam, Liberalism and Liberal Democracy, he argues that the relation between Islam, secularism and 
democracy is a complex one that needs to be approached by contextualizing the history of secularism and democracy 
in the West, which reveals a close tie to religious reformation. To put it in his own words, “…religion is a key and 
often ignored variable in the long and tortuous struggle for liberal democracy that social scientists ignore at their own 
analytical peril.” (Hashemi 2009: 177)  
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III. Modernization of Faith: Post-Islamists Work towards Making Islam Compatible with 
Democracy 
In Europe, the Reformation initiated by Martin Luther in the 16th century marked the beginning 
of the modernization of faith. I would like to argue that the work of ‘post-Islamist’ thinkers has 
initiated  similar  modernization  and  change  in  mentality  concerning  the  Islamic  tenets  that 
recognizes pluralism of faiths and rejects violence. Iranian sociologist, Asef Bayat, employed the 
term ‘post-Islamist’ to refer to Muslim intellectuals, who took on the task of modernizing Islam, 
particularly with respect to ideals of human rights and democracy from the late 1980s onward 
(Bayat 2007: 84-90; Ansari 2000: 73-81; Gheisari & Nasr 2006: 116-118). The context within 
which the post-Islamist theorists began to emerge was after the end of war and the death of 
Khomeini, when the postwar reconstruction provided space for reflection on the feasibility of the 
initial radical ideals of the revolution—like exporting the Islamic revolution. While the orthodox 
revolutionaries (Islamists) held on to a socially conservative, politically undemocratic, militarized 
mode of thinking, post-Islamists adopted modernity, embracing its ideals of rationality, freedom, 
human rights, and scientific knowledge. This Islamic aggiornamento
11 aimed to modernize Islam 
by rejecting any monopolistic claims to Islam. Clergy like Mohsen Kadivar (1999, 2007, 2009, 
2010),  Mojtahed  Shabastri  (2000),  Ahmad  Ghabel  (2009),  Hassan  Yousefi  Eshkevari  (2006, 
2000)  and  religious  intellectuals  like  Mostafa  Malkian  (2009),  Saeed  Hajarian  (1997,  1999), 
Hossein Bashiriyeh (2006, 2001), and Abdolkarim Soroush (2000), just to name a few, began 
articulating the canons of a progressive and tolerant Islam that was compatible with principles of 
human rights and democracy (Dallmayer 2011: 444-45).
12 For example, by drawing on the work 
of such philosophers as Quine and Lakatos, Soroush developed a religious epistemology —the 
theory  of  contraction  and  expansion  of  religious  knowledge—that  separated  religion  from 
religious  knowledge,  allowing  for  multiple  interpretations,  thereby  justifying  religious  and 
political  pluralism  (Soroush  2000:  18,  30-34).  “The  acknowledgement  of  such  varieties  of 
understanding  and  interpretation  will,  in  turn,  introduce  flexibility  and  tolerance  to  the 
                                                           
11 This is a reference to the Vatican aggiornament. During the Second Vatican Council in 1960, the Catholic Church 
modernized  itself  by  accepting  the  discourse  of  universal  human  rights,    including  freedom  of  religion  and 
conscience. 
12 See the special issue of the International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society (Vol. 15, No. 2, Winter 2001) on 
the condition and prospects of political and religious intellectuals in post-revolutionary Iran, where the evolution of 
the thought of Soroush, Kadivar, Mjtahd Shabstri and Yousefi Eshkevari is discussed; also see Farzin Vahdat’s 
“Post-revolutionary Discourse of Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivar: Reconciling the Terms of 
Mediated Subjectivity” Parts I and II in Critique (No. 16, Spring 2000, pp. 31-54 and No. 17, Fall 2000, pp. 135-
157); and Farhad Khosrokhavar, “The New Intellectuals in Iran,” Social Compass June 2004 51: 191-202.  
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relationship of the ruling and the ruled, confirm rights for the subjects, and introduce restraints on 
the  behavior  of  the  rulers.  As  a  result,  the  society  will  become  more  democratic,  humane, 
reasonable, and fair.” (Soroush 2000: 133) 
The  work  of  the  post-Islamists  was  also  characterized  by  an  opposition  to  the  absolute 
supremacy of the religious jurist or vali-e faqih (Bayat 2007: 90, 95; Khosrokhavar 2004: 194; 
Sadri 2001: 265). One of the main venues
13 for the post-Islamist debate was the monthly journal 
Kiyan,  which  obtained  its  license  in  1991  during  Khatami’s  short  tenure  as  the  Minister  of 
Culture and Islamic Guidence.
14 In addition to its publication, in its Tehran office,  Kiyan held 
lectures, workshops, seminars and discussions that were popular with students, laypersons and 
intellectuals  alike.  In  its  reading  groups,  along  with  the  work  of  Muslim  writers  such  as 
Mohammad Iqbal and Ali Shari’ati, the work of Renaissance and modern writers, like Weber and 
Hegel, were read and discussed. The thinkers who were active in this circle not only evolved to 
reject  the  notion  of  sacredness  and  totalitarianism  in  politics  and  to  accept  the  challenge  of 
religious pluralism and the rule of law in the Iranian context, but they also disseminated these 
insights, enabling their readership to change the quality of debate in the public sphere (Mirsepassi 
2010: 132-145). In the early 1990s, a docile public sphere became energized by the questions and 
challenges that post-Islamists were putting to the advocates of revolutionary and traditionalist 
Islam.  The public was given access to a productive debate on the relationship between religion 
and modernity resulting in an opening up of their religiosity (Ibid.: 139).   
In this sense, the work done by post-Islamist thinkers had a significant impact because it 
broke  the  hegemony  of  the  fundamentalist  Islamist  theory.  According  to  the  post-Islamist 
aggiornamento, religion should relinquish its hold on power for the sake of democracy. Hassan 
Yousefi  Eshkevari,  a  liberal-minded  Islamist  declares,  “I  defend  the  theory  of  ‘Islamic 
democratic government,’” because, he argues, “without following a democratic system, Islamic 
government is neither possible nor desirable” (Eshkevari 2006: pp75-77). Along similar lines 
Soroush declares that “it is the religious understanding that will have to adjust itself to democracy 
not the other way around; justice as a value, cannot be religious.” (Soroush 2000: 131) Or more 
radically, Mojtahed Shabestari argues that “The necessity of democratic government cannot be 
derived from the meaning of faith or the religious texts.” (Shabestari 1997: 67) Still, Mohsen 
                                                           
13 Another one was the President’s Center for Strategic Studies created by Sa’id Hajjariyan during Mr. Rafsanjani’s 
last tenure as the president in 1989-1995, when the idea of “political development” was formulated and pursued. 
14 Yousefi Eshkevari traces back the source of the post -Islamist thoughts to Kayhan Publishing Inst itute in early 
1990s and the writers who gathered around two of its publications,  Kayhan Farhangi and Zan-e Ruz (Eshkevari 
2006:26-27).   
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Kadivar goes so far as to declare, “My ideal model of political system is a democratic secular 
government” (Kadivar 2011).  
In addition to post-Islamist arguments for the compatibility of Islam and democracy, some of 
the most influential political philosophers of our time, including John Rawls, Amartya Sen and 
Jürgen Habermas, have confirmed the Islamic aggiornamento. John Rawls draws on the work of 
Abdullahi Ahmad An-na’im
15 to make the point that the main principles of liberal democracy can 
find support from inside comprehensive worldviews like Islam (Rawls 1997: 782). In the same 
spirit Amartya Sen argues that there is no reason why the Islamic Culture in the Middle East  
cannot be hospitable to democracy.  In  The  Idea  of  Justice  he  writes,  “The  Illusion  of  an 
inescapably  non-democratic  destiny  of  the  Middle  East  is  both  confused  and  very  seriously 
misleading—perniciously so—as a way of thinking about either world politics or global justice 
today”  (Sen  2009:  335).  For  his  part  Habermas  has  been  a  mentor  to  many  post-Islamist 
thinkers—Shabestri, Kadivar, and Ganji among others—supporting their efforts to articulate a 
reading of Islam that is receptive to democracy and human rights  (Paya & Amin Ghaneirad 
2007).
16   
It is through the work of post -Islamist thinkers that democracy becomes a legitimate ideal 
for an Islamic state to pursue. Thus, post-Islamists provide a viable alternative to the traditionalist 
reading of Islam, which is inhospitable to democracy and human rights. In doing so, they have 
severely criticized the totalitarian tendencies of the Islamic regime in Iran, making the case for a 
more humanist Islam in line with modern ideals of an open society and freedom. As N ader 
Hashmi writes,  
By situating their moral arguments with one foot in tradition and the other in modernity, they 
act as a critical bridge in the transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. This is 
particularly true when it comes to  introducing new philosophical and theological innovations in 
societies with nonexistent or weak liberal-democratic tradition (Hashmei 2009:101). 
By contrast, the hardliners in power are still engaged in a “pre-modern mode of thought” 
(Habermas 2002, 132–133, 151) characterized by dogmatism and the use of violence.  According 
to  Habermas,  this  quality  is  what  characterizes  fundamentalist  or  unreasonable  religion  and 
                                                           
15  See  his  Toward  an  Islamic  Reformation:  Civil  Liberties,  Human  Rights,  and  International  Law  (Syracuse 
University Press, 1996). 
16 Habermas made a trip to Iran in 2002 on the invitation of Khatami’s Minister of Culture, Ataollah Mohajerani. He 
met and talked with most reformist thinkers and since then has remained in contact with some of them. See here for 
his  interview  with  Franfurter  Allgemine  Zeitung  after  his  return,  http://www.pubtheo.com/page.asp?pid=1073 
(Retrieved on 05/08/2011).  
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distinguishes it from reasonable religion that has comes to terms with religious pluralism, the 
authority  of  scientific  knowledge  and  refraining  from  violence  (Habermas  2003:  104).  This 
means that one camp has crossed over the threshold into democratic politics while the other camp 
is lagging behind. The difference illuminates the change in the religious consciousness of Iranian 
Islam from the traditional to a more reflective mode of thought (Payrow Shabani 2010: 143; 
Payrow Shabani 2011:342).  
 
IV. The Green Movement and Non-violence 
In the context of post-war Iran three groups of political actors were particularly affected by the 
above mentioned learning experiences, giving the Green Movement its peaceful character: 
 
a) By the end of the war, the composition of the Iranian population began to change with the 
majority of the people being under thirty. By the year 2000, the youth made up two-thirds of the 
population. Among the youth one million were university students during the 1990s in Iran. Over 
the  next  two  decades,  this  number  increased  almost  fourfold  to  3,800,000.
17  The  student 
population was a faction of the reform movement that backed Khatami. The Iranian youth consist 
mostly  of  an  urban,  well -educated  and  technologically  savvy,
18  a  population  that  favors 
democratization and has a propensity for such modern ideals as individual freedom and a 
peaceful and open society.  
 
b) During the same period an increasing number of women were attending university—more than 
63 % in recent years (Bashi 2010: 37; Abrahamian 2008: 189; Dabashi 2011: 106). They were 
progressively exhibiting greater social and political awareness, focusing their activities on greater 
civil rights and protesting regressive family law. This struggle was crystalized in the Campaign 
for One Million Signatures to the Repeal of Discriminatory Laws, which began in 2006 and 
quickly gained momentum and gained international recognition. From the very start—the June 
12
th  rally  that  initiated  the  Campaign—the  Iranian  regime  began  brutally  suppressing  the 
Campaign,  harassing,  beating,  and  imprisoning  women  activists,  charging  them  with 
                                                           
17 According to Sa’aid Ghadimi of  the ministry of Sciences, Iran currently has 3, 800,000 university students. 
Reported on BBC Farsi, Friday, 29/04/2011: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/rolling_news/2011/04/110429_l03_iran_university_students.shtml  
18 According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telecommunication, Iran has 25 million 
registered internet users and circa 50 million people have mobile phones (ILNA, 15 December, 2009).  
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“propaganda  against  the  regime.” 
19  The  regime  expanded  its  crackdown  by  prosecuting  the 
lawyers of the activists in order to dissuade others from joining the Campaign, but it enjoyed 
such a broad appeal that it managed to attract people from a wide range of sentiments, from 
Marxist and leftist activists to Muslim feminists and liberal nationalists. Another example of 
women’s  social  and  political  awareness  and  their  activism  happened  two  months  before  the 
presidential  election  in  April  2009,  when  forty-two  women’s  groups  and  several  hundred 
individual  women  activists  from  various  backgrounds  formed  the  Women’s  Convergence 
Coalition. Their goal was to bring to the forefront of the election debates the issue of gender 
discrimination. They approached all the candidates and put two questions to them: would the 
candidate ratify the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women? And 
second, would the candidate revise articles 19, 20, 21, 115 of the constitution that institutionalize 
gender discrimination? Women’s struggle for equality thus became a central issue during the 
presidential campaign.   
 
c) The third group consisted of the members of the Jonbesh Eslahat or Reform Movement—
gathered around such political parties as Jebhyeh Moshrekat Islami or Islamic Participation Front 
and  Sazeman  Mojahedin  Enghlab  Islami  or  the  Organization  of  Mojahidin  of  the  Islamic 
Revolution—who  constituted  the  popular  base  of  Khatami’s  Reform  Movement.  With  the 
suppression of the reform agenda, political apathy grew among the members of this group, but 
with  the  subsequent  election  of  Ahmadinejad  the  reformers  relearned  the  lesson  that  the 
communicative power of the people must be supplemented with political power if it is to be able 
to institutionalize and enact laws that engender change.  
For the purpose of illuminating the peaceful character of the Green Movement, two other 
important features of this political context should be noted: (1) an urbanization trend: This trend 
had started in 1962 with the Shah’s White Revolution, accelerated after the war to the point that 
by the time of Khatami’s presidency 70 percent of Iran’s population was urban (Mirsepassi 2010: 
109; Bayat 2010: 45). (2) Literacy rate: also, at this time, 97 percent of people between six and 
twenty nine years of age were literate (Abrahamian 2008: 189).   
   
 
 
                                                           
19 See http://we-change.org/english/ retrieved on June 29, 2011.  
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IV. Conclusion 
The developmental experiences that have been discussed in the first three sections of this paper 
impacted the aforementioned groups—youth, women and reformists—among the population at 
large.  It  was  within  this  constellation  that  the  Green  Movement  emerged  in  2009.  Kadivar 
describes the main characteristics of the Green Movement as follows:  
First of all, this movement is peaceful and against violence. Second, it is democratic and 
wants  to  uphold  human  rights.  …  Third,  it  is  independent  and  not  planned  by  a  foreign 
government. … Fourth, this movement  is  not after a revolution.  … Fifth,  the leaders of the 
movement and its supporters have chosen green as its color. …Sixth, this movement is absolutely 
against using religion as a tool. … Seventh, it is an ethical movement. (Kadivar 2010:113) 
The regime’s response to the Movement’s legitimate demands for civil rights, however, has 
been most violent. In fact, in one of the prisons called Kahrizak, the extent of brutalities was such 
that  the  Supreme  Leader,  Khamenei,  had  to  order  its  closure.  Indeed,  Kahrizak  became  the 
catalyst for the regime’s deepening legitimacy crisis since no one, not even its supporters, could 
defend raping young men and women protesters in this prison.
20 Yet, in the face of this overt 
violence the Greens remained non-violent. The contrast between the regime’s violence and the 
Green Movement’s peaceful ethos helped score a moral victory for the latter.   
Now, to be clear about the convergent causes I see leading to this peaceful mode of dissent, 
consider that among those Iranians who were looking for a change, nobody advocated another 
bloody revolution. This was largely due to the experiences of the 1979 revolution and the war 
with Iraq that had exhausted the endurance of most Iranians for violence and blood. The concrete 
lesson they drew  from  the past  bloody  experiences  was  that no political  cause  could  justify 
violence and drawing of blood. In Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s—one of the Movement’s leaders—
words, “Non-violent resistance is an uncompromising value of this movement” (Mousavi 2010). 
In my view, this lesson was the foremost achievement of the Iranian opposition. What buttressed 
the insight of this lesson was the opportunity provided by the opening during Khatami’s two 
                                                           
20  The  regime’s  violence  against  demonstrators  and  activists  was  savage.  The  protesters  were  arrested  in  large 
numbers, beaten, imprisoned, tortured, raped and killed. The violence did not stop there but was expanded to include 
the families of victims, their lawyers and their entire support network as a way of exerting pressure on them all, first, 
not to protest and reveal the violence, and secondly, to repent and write confessions and give TV interviews. These 
are not wild allegations made by opposition or foreign journalists but documented and testified to by some of the 
regime’s own children, like Mehdi Karroubi, former speaker of the House of Representatives, as evidenced in his 
letter  to  former  president  Ali  Akber  Hashemi  Rafsanjani  released  on  8  August  2009: 
www.etemademelli.ir/published/0/00/65/6571 (accessed on 8 August 2009), a translation of this letter can be found 
at  http://www.enduringamerica.com/august-2009/2009/8/10/iran-the-karroubi-letter-to-rafsanjani-on-abuse-of-
detainees.html (accessed on 3 June 2011).   
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terms  in  a  newly  formed  public  sphere  to  learn  peaceful  political  civil  action.
21  And what 
energized the public sphere was the active participation of the public intellectuals, religious and 
secular  thinkers  alike,  who  engaged  in  and  fostered  a  culture  of  dialogue  that  valued 
communicative rationality. The public sphere in turn offered a real social space for active citizens 
to practice democracy as a peaceful alternative to fundamentalist modes of political action.
22       
Today, more than two years after the stolen election, the non-violent character of the Green 
Movement remains one of its defining features. Already in 2009, Mir-Hossein Mousavi—one of 
the two reformist candidates who are currently under house arrest—decleared, “The non-violent 
character  of  our  movement  makes  our  victory  such  that  it  does  not  require  anyone’s 
defeat.”(Mousavi 2009) Ramin Jahanbegloo—a social theorist, who was imprisoned and forced 
to give a TV confession—has looked to India and Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violent resistance 
to  draw  relevant  lessons  for  Iran  (Jahanbegloo  2007;  2009).
23  Akbar Ganji—  essayist  and 
political activist—has written about the need for articulating the tenets of national reconciliation 
along the lines of abolishing capital punishment, establishing truth commissions and adopting a 
policy of forgiveness (Ganji 2000, 2009).  
After the first energetic phase of demonstrations by the Green Movement in 2009, and partly 
as a consequence of the regime’s heavy-handed response, the movement, now, has settled into a 
slow but strong mode of resistance that externally finds new ways of protest while it internally 
engages its various members in the practice of dialogue, tolerance and democracy, with the aim 
of being more inclusive and the hope of putting an end to the cycle of violence in the long history 
of  Iranian  politics.  This  dialectic  has  introduced  certain  nuances  into  the  discourse  of  non-
violence,  which  warns  that  non-violence  should  not  become  an  absolute  value  (Bayat  2011) 
where the difference between legitimate and illegitimate violence is blurred (Naraghi 2011), or 
citizens are robbed of the right to self-defense (Orfani 2011).  
I hope to have shown that the aversion to violence resulting from a bloody revolution and the 
war with Iraq, coupled with the opportunity to exercise democracy provided by Khatami’s two 
terms, and the realization that Islam need not be incompatible with the rule of law and human 
rights—thanks  to  the  works  of  post-Islamists—have  provided  learning  experiences  that 
                                                           
21 To put it in his words, “the modernization of religious culture was the aim of the reform movement” (Mohammad 
Khatami, “Nameh-I bara-ye Farda,” www.president.ir (May 2004)) 
22 It is true that after Khatami’s last term and the coming to power of Ahmadinejad the public sphere was suppressed 
by closing the newspapers, disbanding political parties, and imprisoning journalists and civil right activists, but the 
short time during Khatami’s two terms was sufficient as a learning experience of a freer, more open society. 
23 More recently he has been exploring indigenous sources of peaceful ethos in the Iranian culture and history.  
 
14 
transformed some Iranians’ mode of thinking and acting. This developmental growth was then 
marked by a move away from a dogmatic religious thinking and toward a more tolerant mode of 
consciousness  crystalized  in  the  Green  Hope  Movement.  As  such,  the  Green  Movement 
represents a significant evolutionary step in the history of Iranian politics.  
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